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Abstract Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis have argued
that individual-selection accounts of human cooperation
flounder in the face of the free-rider identification problem.
Kim Sterelny has responded to this line of argument for
group selection, arguing that the free-rider identification
problem in fact poses no theoretical difficulty for indi-
vidual-selection accounts. In this article, I set out to clarify
Bowles and Gintis’ argument. As I see matters, the real
crux of their argument is this: solving the free-rider iden-
tification problem, even in modestly sized social groups,
requires that group members are disposed to share social
information with one another. The difficulty for individual-
selection accounts, according to Bowles and Gintis, is that
these accounts have no explanation for why individuals
should be disposed to behave in this way. Having clarified
their argument, I then turn to Sterelny’s criticism, and ar-
gue that Sterelny underestimates the challenge being raised
by Bowles and Gintis. More specifically, I argue that it is
unclear whether the expected benefits of having a dispo-
sition to share social information would have outweighed
the expected costs for an individual belonging to a Pleis-
tocene social group. Importantly, this is not to say that I am
persuaded by Bowles and Gintis’ argument; on the con-
trary, what I claim is that more theoretical (and in par-
ticular) empirical work is necessary before the issues under
discussion can be settled. I formulate some specific ques-
tions which I think future research in this area should aim
to address.
Keywords Communication networks  Group selection 
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Introduction
In their book A Cooperative Species (2011), Samuel
Bowles and Herbert Gintis launch a sustained attack
against individual-selection accounts of human coop-
eration. Their attack is multifaceted and is backed by an
impressive range of modeling, experimental, and arche-
ological evidence. Here my aim is to carefully consider but
a single strand in their overall argument.
Bowles and Gintis argue that individual-selection ac-
counts of human cooperation flounder in the face of the
free-rider identification problem. This is the problem of
identifying individuals who have defected (so as to secure
personal gains) in a cooperative interaction, and making
this information widely known throughout the group. In
order for cooperation to arise and remain stable in even
modestly sized, non-kin-based groups, it is imperative that
free riders (and more or less only free riders) be punished.
However, this cannot happen unless free riders are reliably
picked out and collectively designated as such by the
group.
Kim Sterelny (2012) has recently responded to this line
of argument for group selection, arguing that the free-rider
identification problem is a ‘‘pseudo-problem’’ (p. 181).
What exactly does Sterelny mean by this? We can be sure
he isn’t claiming that the free-rider identification problem,
at least as I have just described it, is not one that actually
exists. Instead, what I take Sterelny to be claiming is just
that, pace Bowles and Gintis, the free-rider identification
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problem poses no real theoretical difficulty for individual-
selection accounts of human cooperation. There is no
reason to think that groups in which this problem is solved
are necessarily ones in which individuals have had their
psychologies shaped by a process of group selection.
I find Bowles and Gintis’ argument from the free-rider
identification problem to group selection interesting but
opaque. In this article, my first task is to clarify their ar-
gument. I suggest that the real crux of their argument is
this: even in modestly sized social groups, the free-rider
identification problem can only be solved provided that
group members are disposed to share social information.
The difficulty individual-selection accounts confront, ac-
cording to Bowles and Gintis, is that these accounts have
no explanation for why individuals should be disposed to
behave in this way. Having clarified their argument, I then
consider its plausibility in light of Sterelny’s criticism.
While there is much in Sterelny with which I agree, I think
he ultimately underestimates the challenge being raised by
Bowles and Gintis for individual-selection accounts. More
specifically, I argue that it is unclear whether the expected
benefits of having a disposition to share social information
would have outweighed the expected costs for an indi-
vidual belonging to a Pleistocene social group. None of this
is to say that I am ultimately convinced by Bowles and
Gintis’ argument. Rather, my view is that more theoretical
(and in particular) empirical work must be carried out be-
fore this debate can be settled, and I conclude by formu-
lating some specific questions that I think future research in
this area should aim to address.
Bowles and Gintis on the Free-Rider Identification
Problem
It is widely held that kin selection is a non-starter when it
comes to explaining human cooperation; the reason being,
the groups our Pleistocene ancestors lived in are believed
to have contained too many non-kin for this selection
mechanism to have been effective. Hence, in the view of
most researchers, we are left with two main individual-
selection mechanisms for explaining cooperation, namely,
reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton
1981) and indirect reciprocity (Sugden 1986; Alexander
1987; Nowak and Sigmund 1998), both construed broadly.1
Bowles and Gintis claim that, for even modestly-sized
social groups, explanations based upon either individual-
selection mechanism (including some combination of the
two) break down.
The following passage offers a nice summary of Bowles
and Gintis’ view on reciprocal altruism. They write:
The reason for the ineffectiveness of reciprocal al-
truism for groups with several members is simple. In
groups of two, a free-rider cannot go undetected be-
cause a player’s payoff reveals the other player’s
behavior. Equally important, when one member de-
fects in order to punish a Defector, the punishment is
uniquely targeted on the Defector. But, in groups
larger than two, a player cannot infer who has de-
fected from the knowledge of his own payoff.
Moreover, a retaliatory defection punishes not only
the initial defector, but also all other members of the
group. Moreover, other group members may not have
observed the initial defection and hence may think
that a retaliatory defection is a free-riding defection,
inviting further retaliatory defections. (p. 64)2
There are two distinct issues being raised by Bowles and
Gintis here. The first concerns the identification of free
riders; the second, the targeting of free riders (and only
free riders) for punishment. Although the second issue is
also of critical importance to the more general debate be-
tween individual-selection and group-selection proponents
in this area, I will set it aside in what follows.
Bowles and Gintis point out that when a cooperative
interaction (with ‘‘simultaneous’’ moves) involves more
than two interactants, there is no guarantee that a given
interactant will know who has cooperated and who has
defected, as this information cannot be ascertained from
one’s payoff. In this regard, such interactions are impor-
tantly different from dyadic ones. Bowles and Gintis also
point out that uncertainty about who has cooperated and
who has defected in the context of past interactions can
have a kind of ripple effect. For example, if an onlooker A
is uncertain as to whether B defected against C in the past,
then there is no guarantee that A will be able to tell whether
C’s current defection against B constitutes a form of free
riding or a form of punishment. Bowles and Gintis take
these considerations to cast doubt on the claim that recip-
rocal altruism can offer an adequate explanation for human
cooperation. But why, exactly?
Before delving into this question, let us have a look at
what Bowles and Gintis say regarding indirect reciprocity.
They write:
1 By ‘‘construed broadly’’ here, I simply mean explanations revolving
around repeated interaction (in the case of reciprocal altruism) and
ones revolving around reputation (in the case of indirect reciprocity).
Below, we will look at a third type of individual-selection
mechanism, namely, partner choice, which also relies crucially upon
reputation. In this regard, partner choice is closely tied to indirect
reciprocity, and I wait until later on in this article to fully distinguish
the two.
2 All page numbers following block quotes in this section refer to
Bowles and Gintis (2011).
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[Indirect reciprocity models have] very demanding
informational requirements. [Their] ability to target
defectors makes [them] an improvement on the re-
peated game models … but this comes at a steep
price. Each individual must know the current stand-
ing of each member of the group, the identity of each
member’s current partner, and whether each indi-
vidual cooperated or defected against his current
partner, since this information is necessary to ascer-
tain the status of one’s partner in the indirect re-
ciprocity game. But real-world dyadic interactions
are often private, and hence are unlikely to be di-
rectly observed by more than a small number of
others, vitiating the model for groups of any sig-
nificant size. (p. 70)
In this passage, we see Bowles and Gintis’ objecting to
the (in their view) demanding ‘‘informational require-
ments’’ of indirect reciprocity. Surely, it is reasonable to be
more impressed by some of these requirements than others.
For example, while knowing the identity of one’s current
partner(s) is probably trivial in the vast majority of real-life
cases, knowing the status of one’s partner(s) (whether they
are in ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ standing in the group), or the status
of the individuals one is watching interact, is definitely not
trivial. Bowles and Gintis are bothered by something else:
they think that, even in small-scale societies, a significant
number of cooperative interactions take place in the pres-
ence of few or no onlookers.3 But again, why exactly do
Bowles and Gintis take these considerations to undermine
explanations of human cooperation based upon indirect
reciprocity?
To be sure, there is an uncharitable way of interpreting
both sets of remarks here. It can seem like what Bowles
and Gintis are claiming is that the free-rider identification
problem is effectively insoluble in even modestly sized
social groups. Or put more fully: repeated interaction
ceases to support cooperation in such groups as interactants
will often be left not knowing who has behaved coop-
eratively and who has behaved selfishly. In addition,
reputational considerations cease to support cooperation
because there is just far too much for group members to
keep track of. The representations group members possess
of the past behavior of others are bound to be significantly
incomplete at best, implying that free riders will often be
treated as cooperators (and perhaps cooperators as free
riders). Consequently, humans’ disposition to cooperate
cannot be explained by appeal to the individual benefits of
such a disposition in the evolutionary past. An individual
belonging to a Pleistocene social group would have been
worse off, not better off, as a result of having a disposition
to cooperate, as free riding would have often gone unde-
tected, and so unpunished. Hence, to explain why humans
nevertheless evolved such a disposition, we must appeal to
selection operating at the level of groups.
The reason I say this would be an uncharitable inter-
pretation of their argument is simple (although I do not
think Bowles and Gintis do enough to discourage this
reading of their argument). It is not just a problem for
individual-selection accounts of cooperation if free riders
cannot be reliably detected. That is, it is also crucially
important, if not equally so, for a group-selection account
such as Bowles and Gintis’ that the free-rider identification
problem can be solved in groups like the ones our Pleis-
tocene ancestors lived in. A free rider in a group of co-
operators will have a higher fitness, and so free riding will
tend to spread through the group unless free riding is
identified and punished. So, even if a group consisted
solely of cooperators at some initial point in time (in which
case, there wouldn’t actually be any free riders to identify
at that time) an inability to solve the free-rider identifica-
tion problem would inevitably give way to what Richard
Dawkins has colorfully described as ‘‘subversion from
within’’ (Dawkins 1976). That is, ‘‘mutation’’ would
eventually serve to introduce free riders into the group, and
once introduced, such individuals would begin to overtake
the group. Consequently, levels of cooperation would begin
to decay and eventually collapse altogether. Bowles and
Gintis are surely aware of this kind of argument against
group-selection accounts of cooperation, as it has long been
held up as group selection’s Achilles’ heel. In a word:
group-selection proponents such as Bowles and Gintis need
a viable explanation for how the free-rider identification
problem gets solved every bit as much as their individual-
selection opponents.
Fortunately, I think there is a much more plausible way
to interpret Bowles and Gintis’ argument, one that is sug-
gested by what they have to say on the topic of informa-
tional sharing between group members. Still discussing the
(purported) shortcomings of explanations of cooperation
based upon indirect reciprocity, they write:
… if individuals are entirely self-regarding, they have
no reason to report truthfully [the behavior] they have
observed. Though an active area of research, expla-
nations of how private information could be con-
verted to accurate public information in a population
of amoral self-regarding individuals have not been
presented.
3 Ideally, one would like to see claims about the frequency of (more
or less) private cooperative interactions buttressed by concrete
ethnographic evidence. Unfortunately, there is not space to consider
the ethnographic literature on this issue here. I set aside skepticism
over Bowles and Gintis’ claim going forward as my impression is that
they are on relatively firm ground.
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Because the truth-telling that is necessary to convert
private to public information cannot be expected in
the absence of social preferences and because public
information is essential to the empirical plausibility
of both the simple reciprocal altruism model and its
indirect reciprocity variant, these models do not
provide adequate explanations of cooperation among
amoral and self-regarding individuals. (p. 70)
To me, this passage lays bare the ultimate reason why
Bowles and Gintis think that explanations for cooperation
based upon either reciprocal altruism or indirect reciprocity
are bound to be inadequate. The reason is not that the free-
rider identification problem is insoluble in even modestly
sized social groups. Rather, it’s just that solving this
problem requires that group members be disposed to share
(truthful) information they possess about one another’s
behavior.4 I will call information about others’ behavior
(including others’ dispositions to behave in various ways)
‘‘social information’’ in what follows.5
Consider reciprocal altruism first. As we saw above,
Bowles and Gintis draw attention to the fact that, when a
cooperative interaction involves more than two interac-
tants, there is no guarantee that a given interactant will
know who has cooperated and who has defected. This is
because the payoff they receive does not reveal such in-
formation. The importance of this point, I suggest, isn’t
that it will therefore be hard or costly for group members to
come to know who has cooperated and who has defected;
instead, it’s that often one will have no choice but to rely
on the reports of others to ascertain such information (for
example, those who were in a position to directly perceive
the act(s) of defection). At this stage of the dialectic,
Bowles and Gintis will then ask (quite rightly in my view)
why it is legitimate for individual-selection accounts of
cooperation to simply assume that individuals are disposed
to share such information. As the last passage makes clear,
Bowles and Gintis’ view is that individual-selection ac-
counts have no explanation for why individuals should be
disposed to behave in this way. Proponents of group se-
lection, by contrast, will say that this disposition reflects
selection at the level of groups (i.e., groups in which in-
dividuals were disposed to share social information with
one another out-survived/competed those in which indi-
viduals were not disposed to behave in such a manner).6
Matters are even clearer in the case of indirect re-
ciprocity. For as Bowles and Gintis point out, reputational
effects will only work to promote cooperation if group
members in fact possess copious amounts of true social
information about one another. Surely, some of this in-
formation can be gathered on the basis of one’s own per-
ceptual experience (including one’s experiences of
observing others interact), but not all of it. This is espe-
cially clear in cases where the interaction takes place in
private (e.g., two individuals go off hunting together). The
rest of this social information, which is a sizable package,
to be sure, must be supplied by others. But again, Bowles
and Gintis will want to know why we should expect group
members to share social information with one another.
Until individual-selection proponents have offered an ex-
planation for how this disposition can evolve via purely
individual-selection means, they will not have offered an
adequate account of human cooperation.
In sum: Bowles and Gintis take the free-rider identifi-
cation problem to pose a serious stumbling block for in-
dividual-selection accounts of human cooperation. In this
section, I have suggested that the real crux of their argu-
ment comes down to the following: the problem of free-
rider identification can only be solved provided that group
members are disposed to share social information. Bowles
and Gintis’ view is that group-selection accounts have a
4 In what follows, I drop the qualifier ‘‘truthful.’’ The reader should
assume that when I talk of sharing information, I mean sharing
truthful or accurate information, unless I explicitly say otherwise.
5 I use the term ‘‘social information’’ rather than ‘‘gossip’’ so as to
avoid the negative connotations associated with the latter.
6 Ultimately, one will want to see a more detailed group-selection
explanation for the evolution of the disposition to share social
information. The motivation for such a desire is that there would seem
to be another ‘‘subversion from within’’ problem lurking in the
Footnote 6 continued
background. If this disposition is, on the whole, individually costly,
then those who lack the disposition will have a higher fitness than
those who possess it when each belongs to the same group. What,
then, is to prevent individuals who lack this disposition from over-
taking the group? (I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my
attention to this issue.)
I think there are a couple of things proponents of group selection
can say at this point, though I do not deny that matters are
complicated. Here, for example, is a sketch of one line of response
which I find to be prima facie plausible. On the reasonable assumption
that the costs of possessing this disposition (if indeed there are some)
aren’t too significant, then the difference in fitness between an
individual who lacks this disposition and one who possesses it cannot
be too significant either. To provide a point of contrast: this fitness
difference is bound to be much smaller than that between an
individual who, say, lacks the disposition to share food (and yet is not
punished/ostracized by group members) and one who is disposed to
share food. Hence, in the case of the disposition to share social
information, it may not be that difficult for selection operating at the
level of the group to offset the process of subversion from within,
despite the slower pace of the former process.
On the other hand, one might think that the only fair-minded thing
to say in this context is that the evolution of this disposition is actually
a theoretical difficulty for both individual-selection and group-
selection accounts (though for different reasons). (This is the view
suggested to me by the above-mentioned referee.) On this view,
Bowles and Gintis’ argument would still be seen as raising an
important evolutionary question (i.e., how could this disposition
evolve?), just not one which group-selection accounts have an
obviously easier time answering. I’m inclined to think that this view
is a bit too strong, but I will not argue for that claim here.
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ready explanation for this disposition, one which human
beings clearly do possess,7 whereas individual-selection
accounts do not.
Sterelny’s Criticism of Bowles and Gintis
Sterelny thinks that the free-rider identification problem
has been much exaggerated by researchers like Bowles and
Gintis. For Sterelny, the only real challenge for individual-
selection accounts of human cooperation is why our
Pleistocene ancestors would have been disposed to punish
free riders (thereby incurring at least a short term cost)
once free riders were identified. Because Sterelny thinks
that a disposition to punish can be explained wholly within
an individual-selection framework, he is unconvinced that
we need to appeal to group-selection to explain how human
cooperation evolved.8
Here is the key passage from Sterelny on Bowles and
Gintis’ argument:
… Bowles and Gintis think that the problem of scale
is intractable for individual-selection accounts of
cooperation. … [C]ooperation is unstable even in
modestly sized groups, unless free riders can be
specifically targeted. That presupposes that such free
riders can be identified and, once identified, punished.
I do not see identification as a serious problem: I have
already argued that in small, repeatedly interacting
band-sized groups, agents will become well-informed
about one another just by direct observation and
memory. This effect is magnified by gossip, once
such communicative capacities evolve. Of course,
gossip is not perfectly honest and reliable, but as I
have argued … multisender, multireceiver networks
are well insulated against deception, and participating
in those networks brings benefits of reciprocation and
information pooling. No social environment is per-
fectly transparent, but in the social environments in
which strong-reciprocity psychologies evolved in,
agents were awash in information about their peers.
(pp. 182–183)9
Sterelny puts several important ideas on the table in this
passage. First, Sterelny claims that direct observation and
memory go considerably further towards identifying free
riders than researchers (in particular, modelers) such as
Bowles and Gintis generally realize. Second, he claims that
the ‘‘shape’’ of human communication networks can serve
to significantly damp down deceptive exploitation. Third,
he claims that participating in such networks produces real
benefits for the individual. Let us consider each of these
ideas, respectively.
I agree with Sterelny that modelers of human coop-
eration often make entirely unrealistic assumptions about
the cognitive abilities of members of real social groups.
Bowles and Gintis are no exception. A good example of
this tendency, one Sterelny actually singles out, can be
found in the first passage from Bowles and Gintis cited
above. Bowles and Gintis tell us that onlookers ‘‘may think
a retaliatory defection is a free-riding defection, inviting
further retaliatory defections’’ (2011, p. 64). Regarding this
assumption, Sterelny writes that:
As the models represent [cooperative] interactions,
onlookers see no intrinsic difference between one
agent defecting against a second, and that agent
punishing the second. In real social environments,
these are very different. For example, communication
among those interacting will be very different. The
defector will be attempting to persuade his victim that
he is in fact cooperating; in the case of punishment,
the agent will be denouncing his target. Denunciation
will not tell us whether the punishment is just. But
onlookers will nonetheless see two very different
interactions. (p. 184)
I am inclined to side with Sterelny here. On the other
hand, his concession that observation alone will not suffice
to tell us whether the one individual is justified in pun-
ishing the other is an important one. (If an onlooker is
unable to tell whether the punishment is just or unjust, he
or she will not know which attitude it is appropriate to
adopt towards the interactant who is doing the punishing.)
More generally, though, I contend that even if Bowles and
Gintis do underplay the role of direct observation and
memory in identifying free riders, the core of their argu-
ment remains intact. If the free-rider identification problem
is to be solved in all but the most intimate social settings, it
is crucial that individuals are disposed to share social in-
formation, and to abstain from deceptive manipulation.
7 See, for example, Emler (1992, 1994), Dunbar et al. (1997), and
Wiessner (2005). Emler sampled from a wide range of conversational
contexts and found that about 70 % of time spent conversing involves
the transmission of social information. Following this study up,
Dunbar et al. examined the content of conversations taking place
between students in a university refectory. They found that about
60 % of conversational time is spent on social information. Finally,
based on 308 multi-hour recordings of conversations between Ju/
’hoansi!Kung individuals, Wiesnner reports that 56 % of conversa-
tions included criticism of group members, and (only!) 7 % praise of
group members.
8 It should be noted that Sterelny is not in general opposed to the idea
that group selection has played a role in human evolution (see 2012,
p. 178, for example); he simply rejects the idea that we need to appeal
to group selection to explain how the disposition to cooperate evolved
in humans.
9 All page numbers following block quotes in this section refer to
Sterelny (2012).
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Surely, this will at least be true when many cooperative
interactions only involve a subset of group members, and
take place in private. My guess is that Sterelny would
concur, as he himself draws attention to the role played by
gossip in solving the free-rider identification problem.
Sterelny’s claim that the shape of a communication
network can serve as an honesty-enforcing mechanism is,
in my view, spot on.10 In particular, Sterelny points out that
when the receiver of a message can check the message’s
truth by consulting several or more group members, it will
often be in the sender’s interest to communicate truthfully,
if he communicates at all. Deception in such a context is
not only unlikely to be effective; it can indeed serve to give
one a bad reputation. In addition, Sterelny points out that as
the number of receivers that a sender communicates with
goes up, so too does the chance that his deception will be
detected.11 This is because it becomes less likely that all of
the receivers involved will be ignorant in a way that makes
them vulnerable to the deception. For example, if a sender
falsely relates that a food patch has been exhausted, he may
well persuade those individuals who have not visited the
patch of late. But he will not succeed in persuading those
who have just visited the patch themselves. So, if the
sender’s deception is broadcast widely, there is a good
chance that it will be received not only by individuals of
the former sort, but also by those of the latter. Together,
Sterelny claims that these two features of human commu-
nication networks will work to undercut the temptation of
self-regarding individuals to deceive their group mates.
Let us assume that ancestral human groups were in fact
characterized by the sort of communication networks
Sterelny has in mind here (i.e., many-to-many networks). If
so, then Sterelny does have an explanation for why the
individuals belonging to such groups would have been
disposed to abstain from the spreading of false information,
an explanation that is at the very least prima facie plausi-
ble. This is key, as widespread deception concerning
others’ behavior certainly seems like it would render re-
ciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity incapable of
supporting cooperation. But, one might wonder, is the
many-to-many nature of such communication networks
really something which individual-selection accounts of
cooperation are entitled to help themselves to? I take it that
part of what makes it the case that a given communication
network is many-to-many is that the nodes belonging to the
network are disposed to share information with one an-
other. Would such a disposition have served to confer a net
expected benefit upon the individual? And more to the
present point, would a disposition for sharing social in-
formation in particular have served to confer a net expected
benefit on the individual? Bowles and Gintis would claim
that a disposition to share social information would not, on
the whole, have been individually advantageous. Sterelny
thinks otherwise. He writes:
It is true that sharing information via gossip is indeed
an N-player cooperation problem. But the costs and
benefits of informational cooperation do not mirror
those of ecological cooperation. Costs are lower;
benefits are higher. The benefits of informational
sharing increase as N increases, for Condorcet-like
effects increase the reliability of consensus. And the
more gossip is multisourced and multitargeted, the
less likely it is to be deceptive manipulation. More-
over, in contrast to sharing material resources, the
costs of sharing information do not increase with the
number of agents aided. But the number of recipro-
cation sources does rise with informational targets.
You can help more people—and hence legitimately
expect help back from more people—for a fixed cost.
Finally, Nowak and Sigmund (2005) point out that
experimental evidence shows that agents are sensitive
to others’ reputation and expect others to be sensitive
to their own reputation. (p. 183)
In my view, this passage cuts to the very heart of the
debate at hand. Sterelny suggests that sharing social infor-
mation is correctly viewed as posing a kind of cooperation
problem in itself. On this point, Bowles and Gintis would
surely agree. However, Sterelny also thinks that individual-
selection accounts have a ready explanation for why indi-
viduals would be disposed to share social information. I
think matters are a good deal more complicated than
Sterelny realizes.
First, Sterelny again draws attention in this passage to
how the many-to-many shape of communication networks
can serve to damp down deception. I am happy to go along
with the idea that the communication networks via which
social information flowed in ancestral human groups were in
fact of this sort. However, the question we are presently
interested in iswhy the individuals belonging to these groups
10 Sterelny does not claim that this is the only honesty-enforcing
mechanism, of course. In particular, he approvingly cites the work of
Sperber (e.g., Sperber 2000, 2001) on the role of folk epistemology in
helping us to evaluate the reliability of various sources. What Sterelny
disagrees with Sperber (and many others) on is that epistemic vigil
against deception is the primary means of keeping deception in check.
Sterelny’s point is that the shape of human communication networks
already does much of this work for us.
11 The communal meetings which many hunter-gathers hold at the
end of each day provide us with a vivid illustration of a communica-
tive situation involving very many receivers. For example, Hames and
Vickers (1982) report that, ‘‘When [Siona-Secoy hunters, an indige-
nous Amazonian people] return from the forest, they gather to discuss
their various successes and failures, the signs of game encountered,
the location of fruiting plants favored by particular species, and the
difficulties of tracking, stalking, and pursuit’’ (p. 368). Other
examples can be found in Ray (1963), Marshall (1976), and Tanner
(1978).
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were disposed to share social information in the first place.
Why were they willing to share social information as op-
posed to simply keeping information of this sort to them-
selves? Appealing to network shape in order to explain the
existence of such a disposition not only seems to get the
order of things backwards (as I just mentioned, a network for
transmitting social information counts as many-to-many in
virtue of the fact that the network’s nodes are disposed to
share social information); it also strikes me as a bit of a red
herring. The truthfulness of the information that in fact flows
through some communication network is one thing; why
there is a network there at all is another. (Of course, the two
are not entirely unrelated. In particular, should deception
become rampant, receivers will presumably stop listening.)
Second, Sterelny says that Condorcet-like effects help to
explain why individuals would have been disposed to share
information. Here he is alluding to the Condorcet Jury
Theorem which tells us that if each ‘‘juror’’ has a more than
50 % chance of being correct, then the probability of the
majority view being correct goes up with the number of
jurors. This suggestion is on the right track in the sense that
it is the right kind of reason for explaining why individuals
would have been disposed to share information. Sterelny’s
idea is that it would have been in individuals’ own self-
interest to pool their information so as to produce Con-
dorcet-like effects. In this way, each individual would have
regularly gained access to more accurate judgments, which
is something that surely would pay at the individual level. I
agree with Sterelny that the logic behind the Condorcet
theorem provides a compelling explanation for why
ancestral humans would have been disposed to share some
kinds of information; what I am skeptical of is that this logic
applies in the case of sharing social information. If, for
example, a group must decide whether they have a better
chance of surviving if they move to a new location rather
than staying put (suppose they are faced with a severe
drought), then the Condorcet theorem tells us that it is in the
self-interest of each individual to speak up. What is far from
clear to me is that this sort of case is a good general model
for thinking about the sharing of social information. To give
a concrete example: suppose that A discovers that B is
hoarding food. Can a disposition for A to inform members
of her group about anti-social behavior of this kind really be
explained, even in some ultimate sense, by A’s gaining
access to a more accurate judgment about B’s personality
type? At the very least, we are surely owed another layer of
detail here, one focused specifically on the sharing of social
information, not information in general.
Sterelny offers two further considerations in support of
his claim that a disposition to share social information can
be explained via individual selection alone. The first of
these concerns reciprocal information sharing. Put roughly,
the idea here is that if A shares information with B at time
t, then B is more likely to share information with A at a
future time t0 than B would have been otherwise. The real
importance of this point for Sterelny in the present context
is that (according to him) the expected costs of sharing
some piece of information remain fixed as the number of
group members with whom this information is shared in-
creases. Consequently, it will be quite easy for the expected
benefits of sharing this information to outweigh the ex-
pected costs. I will look at this line of reasoning in more
detail in the next section.
The other consideration Sterelny raises here concerns
individuals’ reputations. Sterelny cites the experimental
work of Nowak and Sigmund (2005) showing that indi-
viduals condition their behavior (cooperate versus defect) on
the reputations of those with whom they interact, and expect
others to do the same. There is a narrow and broad way of
thinking about results like Nowak and Sigmund’s. Looked at
narrowly, what these results tell us is that when group
members have access to accurate information about how one
has behaved in past cooperative settings, it will often be in
one’s self-interest to behave cooperatively, even when the
chance of a repeat interaction is low (or possibly even nil).
Looked at broadly, these results simply drive home some-
thing which is clear to each of us from everyday life, namely,
humans typically reflect upon what they know about indi-
viduals with whom they are interacting, or with whom they
are contemplating interacting, in deciding on a specific
course of action. On this view, the importance of reputation
extends far beyond prisoner’s dilemma-style interactions; in
particular, reputation is a key factor influencing partner
choice.12 In choosing a partner, we not only attend to how
some candidate partner has behaved towards ourselves and
others in the past; we may also factor in general personality
traits (e.g., is brave, is hot-tempered, etc.) as well as ex-
pertise (e.g., is a plant expert, is mechanically inclined, etc).
It is very probable that reputational effects (construed
broadly) will figure centrally into any plausible individual-
selection account of informational sharing.13 In sharing
information with one’s group members, one can often
indicate to others that one possesses certain otherwise
hidden attributes that make one a desirable partner for fu-
ture activities, activities that will produce real benefits for
the individuals involved.
12 For state-of-the-art work on partner choice in the human domain,
see Baumard et al. (2013).
13 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this insight. Without
his/her detailed comments, I would not have appreciated the
importance of partner choice in this context. The material presented
in the remainder of this section draws heavily upon those comments.
The main way in which my discussion goes beyond that suggested to
me by the referee is in showing how the precise content of the
information that is shared can signal the possession of specific
personality traits (e.g., is very knowledgeable about animal behavior).
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To see how this might go, consider the following case.
Consider an individual A who is disposed to share infor-
mation with his group mates that he has gathered while out
hunting alone. On this particular day, A observes tracks
and other signs left by a prized game animal. On the basis
of these signs, A is able to work out the species, size,
health, and likely whereabouts of the animal. Upon re-
turning to camp, A, as usual, shares this newly acquired
information with his fellow hunters.
From an individual-selection perspective, A’s disposi-
tion can indeed appear quite puzzling. The reason being,
such acts of informational sharing on A’s part would seem
to produce real costs for A.14 For example, when A informs
others that he has observed signs of a high-quality game
animal, and furthermore tells them where he believes the
animal to be located, A lowers the chance that he will be the
first to lay eyes upon the animal and make the kill. This is
because other hunters now strike off in pursuit of the prey.15
Wouldn’t A be better off not having such a disposition?
It is surely tempting to think so. This impression is made
all the stronger, I think, by the fact that were A to fre-
quently withhold certain pieces of valuable information
from the group instead, others would generally not be in a
position to directly perceive such acts of defection on A’s
part. In this regard, refusing to share information is im-
portantly different from refusing to share material re-
sources like food or to provide physical assistance to others
(when one is visibly strong).
The problem with this way of thinking is that it does not
take into account the benefits our individual A would be
likely to see as a result of having such a disposition. In
regularly sharing valuable information that he has gathered
while out hunting, A not only builds and maintains a
reputation as a helpful and generous member of the group;
in addition, he cultivates the perception in others that he is
keen-minded and a strong natural historian (not just any-
one can recognize animal tracks, infer the quality of the
animal, infer its direction of movement, etc).16 Of course,
these are just the sorts of (otherwise hidden) attributes that
make one an excellent partner for a wide range of hunter-
gather activities. Thus, while A’s disposition may well
have real individual costs, these costs (one might think) are
ultimately outweighed by the reputational gains that flow
from A’s informational sharing. A is more likely to be
chosen for future profitable activities by members of his
group than he would have been had he not shared infor-
mation in this way.
More than a few questions arise at this point regarding
the details of this sort of explanation for informational
sharing. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article
to go down that path. What I plan to do instead is consider
the applicability of this sort of explanation to the case of
sharing social information.
Sharing Social Information
In this section, I turn to the expected costs and benefits of
having a disposition to share social information.
It is helpful to begin by stating what is common ground
between Bowles and Gintis, and Sterelny. First, both agree
that humans are disposed to report on the behavior of others.
(It can hardly be doubted that humans relish the opportunity
to engage in some ‘‘good’’ gossip). Second, both (presum-
ably) agree that there is a widely obeyed norm of truth-
telling as concerns the transmission of social information.
Finally, both would agree that these two facts form (at least
part of) the foundation for an explanation of how the free-
rider identification problem is solved in all but the most
intimate social settings. Were humans not so disposed, then
free riders would too often go unidentified and so unpun-
ished. Consequently, cooperation within the group would
begin to break down and eventually disappear altogether.
On what do the two parties disagree, then? As I see
matters, what they ultimately disagree on is whether an
individual-selection explanation for these facts about hu-
man communication can be provided. Bowles and Gintis
think that no such explanation is forthcoming. Sterelny, by
contrast, thinks that proponents of individual-selection
have a ready explanation.
Below, I set aside issues about truthfulness. I agree with
Sterelny that the opportunities individuals encounter to
engage in successful deception have been much overesti-
mated by researchers. It is true, however, that those fea-
tures of human communication networks which serve to
damp down deception (the fact that information is multi-
targeted and multisourced, as Sterelny says) should not be
taken for granted by proponents of individual-selection, but
I will not consider this issue further here. Instead, in the
remainder of this article, my focus will simply be on why
individuals are disposed to share social information at all.
14 To be clear: I here assume that the hunter is perfectly capable of
bagging the prey without enlisting the help of others. If he weren’t,
then his sharing of such information, at least with some of his group
members, wouldn’t be at all surprising. I thank an anonymous referee
for this clarification.
15 Of course, even if meat is typically shared amongst the group, it is
not hard for us to imagine reasons why each hunter prefers to be the
one who actually bags the prey. For example, he who bags the prey
may enjoy an uncontested claim to some especially highly valued
portion of the meat.
16 Marlowe (2010), for example, relates how Hadza people attempt to
signal that they have ‘‘good eyesight, coordination, strength, knowl-
edge, endurance, [and] bravery’’ (p. 231). Marlowe’s discussion
concerns the sharing of particular foods (it may take great bravery,
say, to secure a certain food type), but shared information (if true)
could serve essentially the same purpose.
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In determining whether an individual-selection explanation
can ultimately be provided for this disposition, we need to
inquire into the expected costs and expected benefits of
having such a disposition. If it is plausible that the expected
benefits would have outweighed the expected costs, given
the kind of social groups our Pleistocene ancestors lived in,
then I take it that a disposition to share social information
can indeed be explained along individual-selection lines.
But if it is plausible that the expected costs would have
failed to outweigh the expected benefits, then I take it that
some other kind of explanation must be provided (i.e., ei-
ther a group-selection explanation or else some kind of
nonadaptive explanation17).
Let us consider the expected costs first. To be clear, what
we are looking for are expected costs that typically accom-
pany acts of sharing social information, not ones that arise
from the details of highly specific social interactions. (For
example, we don’t want to factor into our analysis at this
stage cases in which one would be violating the expectations
of one’s communicative partners, were one to share some
piece of social information with them.) I think there is at
least one major source of expected costs that individuals
incur by sharing social information, though these expected
costs are limited only to the sharing of negative social in-
formation, that is, information about socially disapproved of
behaviors. (I think negative information is pretty clearly the
more important of the two types of social information—the
other being positive social information, that is, information
about socially approved of behaviors—when it comes to
sustaining cooperation, though I won’t argue for that claim
here.) The expected costs stem from the relation that the
sharer bears to the target of the information being shared,
whereby ‘‘target’’ I mean the individual whose behavior the
information is about.
Suppose A shares some negative and therefore poten-
tially damaging information about individual B with group
members C, D, E, and so on. In so doing, A incurs a risk.
The risk is this: should B come to know that A has shared
this information with members of the group, B may well
retaliate against A. Of course, one way B may learn of this
fact is that one of the individuals A informs (or one of the
individuals that is informed by an individual that A in-
forms, etc.) simply tells B. That is, some individual may
alert B (perhaps in an attempt to win favor with B) that A is
sharing information about B’s antisocial behavior. Alter-
natively, if the information in question is something only A
would know, as would be the case when the information
concerns B’s behavior in the context of some private in-
teraction between A and B, then the fact that this infor-
mation has spread beyond A will, by that very fact, alert B
that A (and possibly others) have shared this information.
Now, B’s retaliation against A may assume a variety of
forms. One thing B might do is simply break off a preex-
isting social or utilitarian arrangement with A, an ar-
rangement that has brought A real benefits in the past. (For
example, perhaps B has been a useful hunting partner to A
in the past, and now B refuses to hunt with A; or perhaps B
is an expert weaponry maker, and now B will no longer
trade with A.) However, B might not be so coolheaded. In
the extreme case, B’s retaliation against A may take the
form of full-fledged physical violence against A. Whether
retaliation of the latter sort would ultimately be more costly
for A than retaliation of the former will of course depend
on a range of variables. At any rate, the important thing to
note is just that, in sharing negative social information with
one’s group mates, an individual thereby incurs the possi-
bility of real target-induced costs. Moreover, it would ap-
pear that the expected costs will in general rise with the
number of individuals that one informs, assuming that
sharing this information with a larger number of indi-
viduals increases the chance of the target learning that one
has shared negative information about him.
What about the expected benefits that typically accom-
pany the sharing of social information? In the last section,
we mentioned two possible sources of expected benefit,
namely, reciprocal informational sharing and reputational
gains. Let us take these, respectively. Suppose that A
shares information with C about B’s (let’s say, antisocial)
behavior. In so doing, A may be contributing a real benefit
to C; C may have been considering B as a partner for a
future activity, one requiring trust and honesty, and now C
knows she should avoid B. C recognizes this good deed on
A’s part and is inclined to pay it back. More specifically, C
now provides A with some valuable social information (or
perhaps some other kind of information18) at a future point
17 The fondness which we show for sharing social information
certainly stands out in comparison with our feelings towards sharing
other kinds of information. One might think that this constitutes
strong evidence that our disposition to share such information has
been shaped by one or another selective force. Put differently, one
might think that it is very unlikely that we would show such a
fondness for sharing social information by chance alone or as a by-
product of some other psychological trait. If this is correct, then we
should obviously be quite skeptical of any nonadaptive explanation
for our disposition to share social information. This is really a topic
deserving of an in-depth treatment of its own, however. I take no
definite stance on the relative plausibility of adaptive versus
nonadaptive explanations for this disposition in the present work.
18 The possibility that acts of sharing social information might be
‘‘paid back’’ by acts of sharing other kinds of information (e.g.,
ecological information), or just information more generally, is an
important one. There is not room to consider this possibility here,
however, and so I set it aside in what follows. What I want to focus on
is the possibility that, in sharing social information, an individual
gains access to a specific domain of information (social information)
that she would lack access to if she did not herself share social
information.
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in time. The contrast case to consider here is one in which
A instead withholds this information from C, and C, as a
result, withholds valuable social information from A in the
future. Assuming this kind of pattern generalizes, it is easy
to see that A gains real benefits from a disposition to share
social information. A can reliably expect to receive social
information back from all, or at least most, of those indi-
viduals whom she has aided with social information.
Moreover, at least in the case of positive social informa-
tion, we would intuitively expect (apparently incorrectly,
as it turns out—see below) the expected costs of sharing
such information to remain fixed as the number of indi-
viduals one informs goes up.
Moving on to reputational gains: it has been suggested
that, by sharing social information, one can send a signal to
others that one enjoys a place of social power or influence
within one’s group (e.g., Kurland and Pelled 2000; Dunbar
2004; Foster and Rosnow 2006; Guerin and Miyazaki
2006). The idea here is that only those individuals who
enjoy a place of social power within the group will have
much social information to share; hence, one should indeed
share this sort of information, and share it widely, if one
has it. This explanation makes use of the same kind of logic
that we used to explain a disposition to share ecological
information (or more precisely, information acquired while
out hunting) in our example from the last section. That is,
in both cases, the acts of informational sharing which flow
from the disposition work to cultivate the perception in
others that the sharer has certain attributes that make him
or her an attractive partner for some range of activities (in
the case at hand, the revealed attribute is a high degree of
social power).
I claim that we cannot hope to settle the issues at play by
simple reflection on the possible costs and benefits of
sharing social information in the sorts of groups our
Pleistocene ancestors lived in. We can imagine reasons
why having such a disposition might work to the indi-
vidual’s benefit, but we can also imagine reasons why it
could hurt the individual. Unfortunately, what little ex-
perimental work exists in this area hardly gives us a clear
verdict. At most, what this work entitles us to conclude is
that being disposed to share social information at high
frequencies (to report on others’ behavior often, and to a
wide audience) is likely detrimental to the individual on the
whole (Turner et al. 2003; Farley 2011). (Surprisingly, this
appears to be true even when much of the social infor-
mation one shares is of the positive variety.) In a word,
those who share social information at high frequencies are
apparently perceived as being less trustworthy, less like-
able, and less socially powerful than those who share social
information at low frequencies. Of course, it is not hard to
see how such perceptions on the part of others might
translate into real costs for the individual (and this is to say
nothing of the target-induced costs mentioned above). Most
obviously: having a reputation for being a ‘‘big mouth’’
may well deter others from sharing social information with
you, and may even cause you to be excluded altogether
from social interactions where sensitive information is
likely to be divulged.19 What this work does not tell us is
how a disposition to share social information at a more
moderate level might bear upon individual fitness (a point
Farley herself makes in discussing the shortcomings of her
study), although it does seem to rule out simpleminded
versions of the idea that sharing social information can be
explained by status enhancement.
More theoretical and (in particular) empirical work20 is
definitely needed in this area before we can hope to
definitively answer whether the human disposition to share
social information can be explained from a purely indi-
vidual-selection perspective. To begin with, we will pre-
sumably need a much more precise description of the
patterns of informational sharing which individuals actu-
ally engage in. (Since there are bound to be individual as
well as cultural differences as regards such sharing, we will
eventually want to replace talk of ‘‘the disposition to share
social information’’ with more detailed language. I bracket
this complication below, as I have done so far in this ar-
ticle.) More specifically, we will need to know, among
other things:
• How is individual decision making about whether to
share social information sensitive to the relationship
between a potential sharer and the target of that
information?
• How is such decision making sensitive to the relation-
ship between a potential sharer and his or her commu-
nicative partner(s)?21 and
• How is such decision-making sensitive to the specific
content22 of information that is a candidate for sharing?
19 The reason I did not include these expected costs earlier in the
discussion in this section is that they flow from a rather extreme form
of the disposition to share social information.
20 I construe ‘‘empirical’’ broadly, so as to include, for example,
looking to preexisting ethnographic accounts to gain a better
understanding of how social information is exchanged in small-scale
societies.
21 The experimental work of Turner et al. cited in the foregoing
paragraph did look at how perceptions of the sharer were affected by
relation to the sharer (i.e., whether the sharer was a friend or a
stranger). Surprisingly, they found that sharing social information,
regardless of whether it was positive or negative, tended to adversely
affect perceptions of the sharer for both types of relationships. What I
am asking about here is different, though. I am asking how
individuals factor in their relationship to their communicative
partner(s) in deciding what social information, if any, to share with
the latter. A more general question here is how such decision making
is sensitive to the personality traits of one’s communicative partner(s).
22 I have more in mind than simply whether the information is
positive versus negative.
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In short, we will need a fuller picture of the factors that
enter into individuals’ decisions about which social infor-
mation to share and with whom to share it. But in addition
to these questions focused on the sharer side of things, we
will also need to know how acts of sharing tend to affect
the behavior of those with whom social information is
shared. In particular:
• If A shares social information with B, is it actually the
case that B is more likely to share social information
with A in the future than if A hadn’t shared such
information with B?
• If A regularly (though still selectively in some sense)
shares social information with his or her group mates, is
A actually more likely to be chosen as a partner for
future activities that pay off for A?
With even partial answers to these questions, we will be
in a much better position to evaluate the claim that the
disposition to share social information can be explained via
individual selection alone. That is, we will be better able to
assess the claim that, for an individual belonging to a social
group of the sort our Pleistocene ancestors lived in, the
expected benefits to the individual of having such a dis-
position would have outweighed the expected costs.
Where have we gotten to, then? We began by clarifying
Bowles and Gintis’ argument from the free-rider identifi-
cation problem to a group-selection account of the evolu-
tion of human cooperation. I claimed that the real crux of
their argument is not that this problem is exceedingly dif-
ficult to solve in even modestly sized social groups, but
rather that its solution in such groups requires that indi-
viduals are disposed to share social information with one
another. This is the explanatory challenge that I think
Sterelny underestimates. While Sterelny does realize that
proponents of individual-selection accounts cannot simply
take such a disposition for granted, the brief explanation he
gives leaves too many important questions unanswered.
Crucially, however, this is not to say that we should be
convinced by Bowles and Gintis’ argument; they are un-
duly skeptical, I think, of the possibility that an adequate
individual-selection explanation for the disposition to share
social information can be provided. I leave the examination
of this possibility for another day.
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